Foresight
Forward reads on questions that move markets. Each leads with a calibrated band; the point estimate rides underneath, and every read is scored openly against a resolution criterion written before the outcome is known. See the track record.
How these are made. Questions inside the engine's validated domains, sanctions enforcement, OPEC+ decisions, and escalation at chokepoints, run through a game-theoretic and behavioural engine: a bargaining and signalling model of the named actors, run as a Monte Carlo ensemble, with an intent layer that sharpens the read where evidence about resolve exists. The engine has been validated against a climatology baseline, not against a live analyst, and every resolved call lands on the track record, hits and misses alike. Questions outside those domains get a judgment read: the same structure, no number, because the engine has not earned one there.
Engine reads
Engine readOil · FX17 Jul
Will the latest Western sanctions designation on the oil producer's banking and shipping intermediaries actually be enforced this quarter, rather than announced and left unenforced?
likelycentral 59 in 100moderate confidence
by end Q4 2026
The read, the drivers, and how it resolves +
Run the designation forward and it is not a single yes or no but a spread of outcomes. A measure almost always lands; the live question is whether the sender then enforces it or only announces it, and that split is where the risk sits. The path turns on the sender's true resolve, which is read through primary sources rather than the public record.
Players and wants
Sender bloc wants the designation to land hard enough to change behaviour, but carries a domestic incentive to be seen acting whether or not it then enforces.
Intermediaries want to keep clearing cargo and payments. Their own banking and insurance access is exposed to secondary measures, so genuine enforcement bites them fast.
Co-enforcers follow the sender's lead. They tighten only once they read the sender as serious, and look away while the sender only announces.
What would change this
- the sender's true enforcement resolve, the hidden type a network read reveals
- the discount on sanctioned cargo; freight and insurance rates
- sender bloc's public position and signalling
Position lens argues for keeping the enforcement-tightening trade small and two-way until a network read or an enforcement tripwire resolves which side of the swing the sender is on.
ResolvesResolves 'occurred' if, within 90 days of generation, public reporting (OFAC actions, Lloyd's List, tanker-tracking, or a G7 statement) shows the designated intermediaries losing banking, insurance, or shipping access such that sanctioned-cargo flows measurably fall. Resolves 'did_not_occur' if the designation stays nominal and flows continue. Source of record: OFAC press releases and Lloyd's List.
Full read and permalink →This read beats a naive baseline, not a proven analyst. It is calibrated against a climatology reference and scored openly, including the misses.
Engine readOil17 Jul
Will OPEC+ agree a substantial coordinated production cut at its next ministerial, rather than a token or no measure?
unlikelycentral 45 in 100moderate confidence
at the next OPEC+ ministerial
The read, the drivers, and how it resolves +
Run the OPEC+ decision forward and some measure almost always clears, because the cohesive producers want it and carry it. The live question is whether the swing producer lets it be substantial or waters it down to something marginal. That split, not the headline group cohesion, is the part of the distribution your spread is exposed to.
Players and wants
Cohesive producers want a deep coordinated cut to defend price into a softening demand picture, and are willing to carry more of it themselves.
Swing producer holds the effective veto and currently leans against a cut, prioritising volume and market share. The pivot the whole call rests on.
Smaller members sit neutral and follow the consensus once the two heavyweights settle which way it goes.
What would change this
- the swing producer's public stance and signalling going into the meeting
- the other actors' public position and signalling
- the smaller producers' positions firming for or against a deeper cut
Position lens argues for expressing the view through a calendar spread rather than flat price, sized small until a network read or a pre-meeting signal resolves the swing producer's stance.
ResolvesResolves 'occurred' if OPEC+ announces a coordinated cut of at least 1 million barrels per day in genuine supply (not a paper reallocation of quotas already exceeded). Resolves 'partial' for a smaller or largely-paper cut, 'did_not_occur' for no cut. Source of record: the official OPEC ministerial communique.
Full read and permalink →This read beats a naive baseline, not a proven analyst. It is calibrated against a climatology reference and scored openly, including the misses.
Engine readOil · Gold · FX17 Jul
Will there be a major military escalation at the Strait of Hormuz this quarter (a state-level strike, seizure campaign, or attempted closure), rather than continued brinkmanship?
roughly even chancecentral 50 in 100moderate confidence
by end Q4 2026
The read, the drivers, and how it resolves +
A major escalation is a single decision-maker's call, and the public record genuinely supports either path: the cost of acting is visible and already priced, while the resolve behind the threat is not. We hold both paths at their true weights rather than forcing a lean, and a primary-source read on the decider's resolve is what moves the distribution decisively.
Players and wants
The decider weighs a coercive escalation against the cost of acting. The ex-ante incentives are genuinely balanced, which is why open-source analysis sits at a coin toss.
Counterparties would respond to a closure, raising the decider's cost. That cost is visible to everyone and is already priced; it does not break the tie.
What would change this
- the decider's resolve and intent, read through primary sources rather than the public record.
Position lens argues against carrying a directional chokepoint position on the public picture alone. Size only once a network read or a hard tripwire resolves the decider's intent.
ResolvesResolves 'occurred' if, within 90 days, there is a state-attributed military action that materially disrupts Hormuz transit (a naval engagement, a sustained seizure campaign, mining, or a declared closure) confirmed by two of: IMF PortWatch transit data, JMIC/UKMTO advisories, or major-wire reporting. Resolves 'did_not_occur' if brinkmanship continues without a material transit disruption. Source of record: IMF PortWatch plus UKMTO advisories.
Full read and permalink →This read beats a naive baseline, not a proven analyst. It is calibrated against a climatology reference and scored openly, including the misses.
Judgment reads (no number)
Judgment readAgs · Nat gas · Metals · FX17 Jul
Will a formal Russia-Ukraine ceasefire hold for 30 consecutive days or more before the end of 2026?
unlikelyno number, by designlow confidence
by end 2026
The read, the drivers, and how it resolves +
Positions on territory and NATO remain far apart, and past ceasefires have not held; a durable 30-day halt is a high bar on this horizon.
Players and wants
Russia recognition of territorial gains and a Ukraine outside NATO
Ukraine sovereignty, security guarantees, and no formal cession of territory
United States and Europe an end to the war on terms that do not reward aggression, at a sustainable cost
What would change this
- a battlefield stalemate that raises both sides' appetite for a pause
- a shift in US or European military support
- a domestic political change in Moscow or Kyiv
ResolvesResolves 'occurred' if a publicly-declared ceasefire holds without major hostilities for at least 30 consecutive days before 31 December 2026, per OSCE or major-wire confirmation. Resolves 'did_not_occur' otherwise. Source of record: OSCE reporting and major wires.
Full read and permalink →This is a structured-judgment read, not an engine forecast. It carries no probability number, only a plausibility read in words, and it is scored openly.
Judgment readOil · Gold · FX17 Jul
Will the United States and Iran reach a formal nuclear agreement by the end of Q4 2026?
unlikelyno number, by designlow confidence
by end Q4 2026
The read, the drivers, and how it resolves +
Active hostilities and deep mutual distrust make a durable formal agreement a hard ask on this horizon; the base rate for such deals landing inside a single quarter is low.
Players and wants
United States verifiable limits on enrichment and a durable freeze, with domestic political cover
Iran sanctions relief and regime security guarantees without conceding breakout capacity
Israel and Gulf states no deal that leaves Iranian enrichment intact; a veto on Western concessions
What would change this
- a de-escalation at the Strait of Hormuz that reopens a diplomatic channel
- a US or Israeli domestic shift that changes the appetite for a deal
- an Iranian economic crisis that raises the value of sanctions relief
ResolvesResolves 'occurred' on a signed or publicly-confirmed US-Iran nuclear agreement (a JCPOA successor or interim deal) by 31 December 2026. Resolves 'did_not_occur' otherwise. Source of record: US State Department and IAEA statements.
Full read and permalink →This is a structured-judgment read, not an engine forecast. It carries no probability number, only a plausibility read in words, and it is scored openly.
Judgment readEquities · FX · Metals · Ags17 Jul
Will the United States impose broad new tariffs on Chinese goods this quarter?
roughly even chanceno number, by designlow confidence
by end Q4 2026
The read, the drivers, and how it resolves +
Tariff policy has been an active lever and could move either way inside a quarter, so the honest read is a genuine coin toss rather than a confident call.
Players and wants
United States leverage on trade and industrial policy, with political benefit at home
China to avoid a tariff spiral while defending its export base
US importers and markets predictability; they price tariff risk into equities and the currency
What would change this
- a trade-negotiation breakdown or a fresh flashpoint
- the US political calendar and the administration's posture
- a Chinese retaliation that raises the cost of escalation
ResolvesResolves 'occurred' if the US announces new tariffs covering at least USD 50 billion of annual Chinese imports within 90 days. Resolves 'did_not_occur' otherwise. Source of record: USTR announcements and the Federal Register.
Full read and permalink →This is a structured-judgment read, not an engine forecast. It carries no probability number, only a plausibility read in words, and it is scored openly.
Judgment readOil17 Jul
Will the United States materially ease oil sanctions on Venezuela this quarter?
unlikelyno number, by designlow confidence
by end Q4 2026
The read, the drivers, and how it resolves +
Easing has been repeatedly conditioned on political steps that have not been met, so on the base rate a material loosening inside a quarter is unlikely.
Players and wants
United States political conditionality tied to Venezuelan governance, balanced against oil-market relief
Venezuela revenue and legitimacy without meeting the political conditions
US oil buyers additional heavy crude supply if licensing widens
What would change this
- a Venezuelan political concession that unlocks conditional relief
- a tightening of the global heavy-crude balance that raises the value of the barrels
- a US policy shift on the whole sanctions posture
ResolvesResolves 'occurred' if the US issues a general or sector license that measurably raises Venezuelan crude exports within 90 days. Resolves 'did_not_occur' if sanctions stay in force or licensing stays narrow. Source of record: OFAC actions and Venezuelan export data.
Full read and permalink →This is a structured-judgment read, not an engine forecast. It carries no probability number, only a plausibility read in words, and it is scored openly.
Judgment readOil · Nat gas · Ags17 Jul
Will Bab el-Mandeb shipping transits recover to at least 80 percent of their pre-2024 baseline before the end of Q4 2026?
unlikelyno number, by designlow confidence
by end Q4 2026
The read, the drivers, and how it resolves +
Carriers move slowly and need a durable guarantee, not a quiet spell, so a full recovery inside the horizon is a stretch even if the shooting stops.
Players and wants
Houthi forces leverage tied to the wider regional conflict; a reason to keep the threat live
Shipping lines a durable security guarantee before returning to the route rather than a lull
Western navies to reopen the corridor without an open-ended military commitment
What would change this
- a regional de-escalation that removes the Houthi rationale
- a security arrangement that insurers and carriers actually trust
- a single incident that resets carrier confidence to zero
ResolvesResolves 'occurred' if IMF PortWatch shows Bab el-Mandeb daily transits at 80 percent or more of the 2023 average, sustained over a 30-day window, before 31 December 2026. Resolves 'did_not_occur' otherwise. Source of record: IMF PortWatch.
Full read and permalink →This is a structured-judgment read, not an engine forecast. It carries no probability number, only a plausibility read in words, and it is scored openly.
Judgment readEquities · Metals · FX17 Jul
Will China conduct a major military exercise around Taiwan this quarter?
roughly even chanceno number, by designlow confidence
by end Q4 2026
The read, the drivers, and how it resolves +
Large PLA exercises have become a recurring signalling tool, so a major one inside any given quarter is close to a coin toss and turns on specific triggers.
Players and wants
China to signal resolve and deter Taiwanese and US steps, at a controllable cost
Taiwan to maintain deterrence and international support without provoking a spiral
United States to deter a blockade while avoiding a direct clash
What would change this
- a Taiwanese political statement or a US arms or diplomatic move that Beijing treats as a trigger
- the PLA exercise calendar and anniversaries
- a wider regional crisis that raises or lowers the appetite for a show of force
ResolvesResolves 'occurred' if China runs a named large-scale joint exercise encircling or blockading Taiwan (Joint Sword scale or larger) within 90 days, confirmed by Taiwan's MND and major wires. Resolves 'did_not_occur' otherwise. Source of record: Taiwan Ministry of National Defense.
Full read and permalink →This is a structured-judgment read, not an engine forecast. It carries no probability number, only a plausibility read in words, and it is scored openly.